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75 
HISTORICAL GLOSS: A PRIMER 
Alison L. LaCroix 
In the separation of powers section of the constitutional law canon, 
no case dominates discussion more than Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer.1  The case is distinguished not only by its evocatively indus-
trial, midcentury sobriquet, “the Steel Seizure Case,” but by the num-
ber of talismanic phrases that it injected into the constitutional law 
conversation.  “Zone of twilight,” “imperatives of events and contem-
porary imponderables,” and the summing of executive and legislative 
powers through “plus” and “minus” operations all appear in the con-
currence by Justice Robert Jackson that has come to be understood as 
the “law” of Youngstown.2 
In contrast both to Justice Jackson’s scheme of assessing presiden-
tial power in light of specific instances of congressional action, and to 
the categorical distinction between executive and legislative power en-
dorsed in Justice Hugo Black’s majority opinion, Justice Felix Frank-
furter offered his own Delphic addition to the permissible sources of 
presidential power.  Rejecting the “inadmissibly narrow conception of 
American constitutional law” that would hew only to “the words of the 
Constitution” and ignore “the gloss which life has written upon them,” 
Justice Frankfurter added a third source of presidential authority to 
Justice Black’s Constitution and Justice Jackson’s Constitution-plus-
Congress.3  This “gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by 
§ 1 of Art. II”4 stemmed from “a systematic, unbroken, executive prac-
tice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before 
questioned.”5  Over time, such practices had become “part of the struc-
ture of our government.”6 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.  I thank Daniel Abebe, William Bird-
thistle, Adam Cox, Aziz Huq, and David Strauss for their helpful comments.  I also thank Patricia 
Herold for excellent research assistance and the editors of the Harvard Law Review  
Forum for their thoughtful suggestions. 
 1 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 2 Id. at 637, 635 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also, e.g., David Cole, Youngstown v. Curtiss-
Wright, 99 YALE L.J. 2063, 2081 (1990) (reviewing HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY CONSTITUTION (1990)); Mark D. Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown: Against the View 
That Jackson’s Concurrence Resolves the Relation Between Congress and the Commander-in-
Chief, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1703 (2007). 
 3 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 4 Id. at 611. 
 5 Id. at 610.  
 6 Id. at 610–11. 
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A key element of this gloss originated in the actions of Congress: 
“long-continued acquiescence” from the legislative branch could add 
“decisive weight to a construction by the Executive of its powers.”7  To 
back up this theoretical assertion, Justice Frankfurter offered fourteen 
pages of historical appendices relevant to the specifics of the steel sei-
zure: a “Synoptic Analysis of Legislation Authorizing Seizure of Indus-
trial Property” and a “Summary of Seizures of Industrial Plants and 
Facilities by the President.”8  Justice Frankfurter thus posed a broader 
inquiry into congressional acquiescence in steel-seizure-like scenarios, 
in contrast to Justice Jackson’s analysis of Congress’s specific res-
ponses to President Truman’s gambit.  Ultimately, Justice Frankfurter 
held that the history of congressional and presidential practice 
amounted not to acquiescence, but rather to a “conscious choice”9 not 
to grant the president seizure authority, a choice made manifest in the 
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.10 
In their provocative article, Professors Curtis Bradley and Trevor 
Morrison seek to fill a scholarly gap focusing on the Frankfurterian 
strand of separation of powers reasoning.  They describe their project 
as examining the “role of historical practice in discerning the separa-
tion of powers,” with special attention to the “actual dynamics of con-
gressional-executive relations.”11  From historical practice, or historical 
gloss (about which terms more infra), Bradley and Morrison turn to a 
related inquiry raised in Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence.  According 
to the concurrence, evidence of the “gloss which life has written upon” 
the words of the Constitution” could be divined from a “systematic, 
unbroken executive practice” if that practice was accompanied by 
“long-continued acquiescence” by Congress.12  Bradley and Morrison 
follow Justice Frankfurter’s analysis by first considering the meaning 
of acquiescence and then suggesting that acquiescence is necessary in 
order for a given set of practices to constitute a sufficient gloss on ex-
ecutive power to become a source of presidential authority. 
This short response addresses three central themes raised by Brad-
ley and Morrison’s article: the meaning of historical practice; its short-
comings as a source of constitutional authority; and the significance of 
the “Madisonian model” for the separation-of-powers scheme offered 
by the article. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 7 Id. at 613. 
 8 Id. at 615, 620; see also id. at 615–28. 
 9 Id. at 602. 
 10 Pub. L. No. 80-101, §§ 206–210, 61 Stat. 136, 155–56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 176–179 
(2006)) (outlining procedures for “National Emergencies” but not providing the President with 
seizure authority). 
 11 Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 413–14 (2012). 
 12 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610, 613 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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I.  HISTORICAL PRACTICE: DESCRIPTIVE OR NORMATIVE? 
The title of Bradley and Morrison’s article, “Historical Gloss,” is it-
self a gloss on the words of Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence.  This 
usage is consistent with that of much other constitutional law scholar-
ship; the phrases “historical gloss” and “the gloss of history” are com-
mon in discussions of Youngstown.13  In the first sentence of the article, 
however, the terminology shifts from “historical gloss” to “historical 
practice.”14  Throughout the article, Bradley and Morrison appear to 
use the terms interchangeably.15  “[I]nvocations of the historical gloss 
method tend to emphasize long-term accretions of practice,” they note 
at one point, implying a subtle distinction between the two.16  For the 
most part, however, the article treats the phrases as synonymous. 
But just what is “historical practice,” and is it in fact the same 
thing as the “historical gloss” that posterity has attributed to Justice 
Frankfurter?  Bradley and Morrison are surprisingly reticent on the 
content and contours of their idea of historical practice.  This omission 
is disappointing in an article that aims to remedy what the authors 
rightly describe as a dearth of “sustained academic attention to the 
proper role of historical practice.”17  The phrase “historical practice” 
remains largely unexamined throughout the article.  Bradley and Mor-
rison explore several possible meanings of Justice Frankfurter’s related 
notion of acquiescence (agreement, waiver, accumulated wisdom18), 
but the foundational concept of historical practice remains fuzzy.  Is it 
custom, tradition, prescription, or something else?  Or should we in-
stead see it as something more theoretical — as, perhaps, an element of 
America’s unwritten constitution?19  Not all past activities or habits 
rise to the level of Frankfurterian historical gloss.  But the reader is 
left uncertain as to what counts as relevant, actionable historical prac-
tice.  If historical practice is synonymous with custom, the question 
then becomes how the relevant custom can be identified retrospective-
ly from the disorderly mass of mere day-to-day actions by governmen-
tal actors.  The diversity of possible historical practices that touch on a 
given constitutional dispute requires a practitioner of this mode of 
analysis to state very clearly what counts, and what does not, as rele-
vant practice.  Historical practice is a slippery, unhelpfully capacious 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (“historical gloss”); 
STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 27 (4th ed. 2007) (“Gloss of History”). 
 14 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 11, at 412. 
 15 See, e.g., id. at 418, 425, 428. 
 16 Id. at 427. 
 17 Id. at 413. 
 18 Id. at 433, 435, 434.  
 19 See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION (2012); 
Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975). 
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notion masquerading as a mid-twentieth-century neutral principle.  It 
was so in 1952 and has only become more problematic since then.  To-
day, it defies translation into modern constitutional thought.  Embed-
ded within historical gloss analysis is a view of history as a social 
science providing objective, falsifiable data about the actions and reac-
tions of governmental actors.  To pose the question, “What is the his-
torical practice?,” is to presume an artificial degree of unity and cohe-
rence within institutions, and from one action to another.  Whose 
historical practice matters, and which moment encompasses the rele-
vant distillation of that practice, are complex questions.  Messiness, 
unspoken accommodation, and explicit disagreement abound. 
To see the range of competing historical practices that a legal inter-
preter might consult, consider the example of a particular interbranch 
dispute: the early-nineteenth-century battles over the constitutionality 
of the Bank of the United States.  A key element of Treasury Secretary 
Alexander Hamilton’s financial architecture, the First Bank was char-
tered in 1791 but met its demise in 1811 at the hands of the Jefferson-
ian Congress.  Amidst the economic distress that accompanied the War 
of 1812, Congress passed legislation chartering a new incarnation of 
the Bank.  In 1815, President James Madison, who had opposed the 
creation of the First Bank, took veto pen in hand against the Second 
Bank, only to sign a renewed charter into law in 1816, citing public 
support for the Bank and postwar exigency as the reasons for his re-
versal.  Maryland fought the Bank with its famously destructive tax in 
1818; in 1819, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
Bank in McCulloch v. Maryland.20  Even after that decision, Ohioans 
began to attack their local branches of the Bank, using taxes as well as 
force, in the form of raids on specie.  In 1824, Chief Justice Marshall 
upheld federal jurisdiction on behalf of the Bank, against its Ohio op-
ponents.21  In 1832, President Andrew Jackson declared his opposition 
to the Bank and vetoed its recharter; the veto stood, and over the next 
four years, President Jackson hastened the Bank’s demise by removing 
federal deposits.  By 1836, the Bank had been reduced to a state-
chartered Pennsylvania institution.22 
If we could ask an observer in 1836 to describe the historical prac-
tice between the various branches of government on the subject of the 
Bank, what might she say?  Strong presidential, and even stronger 
Cabinet-level, support for the Bank, followed by decisive congressional 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 20 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 21 Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); see also Alison L. LaCroix, Fede-
ralists, Federalism, and Federal Jurisdiction, 30 L. & HIST. REV. 205 (2012). 
 22 See generally RALPH C.H. CATTERALL, THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 
(1903); Bray Hammond, Jackson, Biddle, and the Bank of the United States, 7 J. ECON. HIST. 1 
(1947). 
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resistance; then presidential resistance but congressional support; then 
presidential support; then redoubled presidential resistance.  Moreover, 
she might point to repeated endorsements of the Bank’s constitutional-
ity by the Court, met with presidential disdain, opposition and self-
help from some states, congressional grants of jurisdiction, and, even-
tually, the exercise of raw presidential power.  The relevant moment of 
historical practice would matter: 1815, 1816, 1819, or 1832? 
To be clear: the history is not indeterminate.  We know a great deal 
about what these actors said, did, and wrote, and historians have me-
thodologies to try to interrogate what political and legal actors thought 
they were doing, and why they thought they were doing it.23  But the 
“historical practice,” in the Frankfurterian sense in which Bradley and 
Morrison use that term, is indeterminate.  Absent an account of which 
practices matter, Bradley and Morrison do not provide a satisfactory 
explanation for why historical gloss is worth salvaging. 
II.  THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY 
Here lies a deeper confusion in the article.  To mount an argument 
for the continued relevance of historical gloss to separation of powers 
disputes, as Bradley and Morrison do, is to make a broader claim 
about the proper sources of constitutional authority.  They characterize 
the goal of their project as descriptive: “to specify what is entailed in 
historical practice–based arguments about executive and legislative 
power, and to identify the factors that are critical for evaluating such 
arguments.”24  Moreover, they take pains to disclaim normativity: for 
instance, while they advert to the growth of executive power since 
World War II, they note, “Unlike some, we do not intend this descrip-
tion to reflect any normative judgment.”25 
On the contrary, however, the central premise of Bradley and Mor-
rison’s argument is that historical practice continues to be, and ought 
to be, a valuable interpretive tool.  Indeed, they state that “[t]o the ex-
tent past practice predicts the future actions of the branches, it should 
arguably inform legal analysis because descriptions of what the law is 
should have some correspondence to operational reality.”26  For Brad-
ley and Morrison, then, defining the “operational reality” that currently 
obtains between institutions is a necessary predicate to determining 
what the future relationship of those institutions should look like.  The 
article thus circles back to the question that Bradley and Morrison 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 23 See Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8 HIST. & 
THEORY 3 (1969). 
 24 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 11, at 485. 
 25 Id. at 447. 
 26 Id. at 456. 
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claim to be avoiding: how should historical practice be used in consti-
tutional interpretation?  And, more important, where does historical 
practice acquire its authority? 
In order to understand whether a particular activity is constitu-
tional, in both the descriptive and normative senses, one must have a 
clear sense of which elements one views as establishing constitutional 
authority: for example, popular understandings, judicial pronounce-
ments, political theory, or constitutional text.27  Bradley and Morri-
son’s ostensible focus is the use of historical practice as a mode of legal 
decisionmaking.  But their account fails to consider the theoretical jus-
tifications that legal and political actors use for employing arguments 
based on historical practice in some situations but not others.  When 
Justice Frankfurter found that Congress’s decision in the Taft-Hartley 
Act not to grant seizure authority to the President meant that there 
was no basis to grant the analogous power to President Truman, he 
was selecting and weighing among historical practices.28  But do Brad-
ley and Morrison agree with Justice Frankfurter that some congres-
sional or presidential practices ought to be elevated to “part of the 
structure of our government”?29  Because Bradley and Morrison do not 
flesh out their conception of historical practice, the reader is left to 
wonder precisely which actions on the part of Congress or the Execu-
tive amount to a basis for deference by another branch.  Moreover, it 
is not clear whether Bradley and Morrison view historical practice as a 
hermeneutic practice that is internal to the Constitution itself, or 
whether they regard it as extraconstitutional.30  This uncertainty in 
turn renders their account vulnerable to Professor Laurence Tribe’s 
caution (which they cite) that some historical practices may in  
fact be little more than “conscious end-run[s] around constitutional  
requirements.”31 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 27 See generally Morton J. Horwitz, A Historiography of The People Themselves and Popular 
Constitutionalism, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 813 (2006) (distinguishing between descriptive or 
“small ‘c’” constitutions and normative or large-C constitutions); Alison L. LaCroix, Rhetoric and 
Reality in Early American Legal History: A Reply to Gordon Wood, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 733 (2011) 
(examining the theory and practice of popular sovereignty and judicial review during the found-
ing period). 
 28 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 614 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,  
concurring). 
 29 Id. at 610–11. 
 30 See AMAR, supra note 19, at xi (describing the Ninth Amendment as a “textual portal wel-
coming us to journey beyond the Constitution’s text”); Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Loose-
ness, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32, 33 (“Originalism without the interpretive theory that 
the Framers and the ratifiers of the Constitution expected the courts to use in construing constitu-
tional provisions is faux originalism.”).  
 31 Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method 
in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1280 (1995). 
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At the end of Bradley and Morrison’s analysis, they return to the 
question of the interpretive status of historical practice.  Discussing 
Myers v. United States,32 in which the Court invalidated the Senate’s 
attempt to limit the President’s power to remove a postmaster, Bradley 
and Morrison observe, “the more an interpreter deems nonpractice ma-
terials to provide a clear constitutional answer to the question at hand, 
the less inclined the interpreter will be to allow historical practice to 
change the Constitution’s meaning.”33  In Myers, the fact that “the 
weight given to historical practice varies inversely with the clarity of 
other sources”34 meant that the Court used a pertinent and apparently 
clear Founding-era textual source to set such a high bar for counter-
vailing historical practice that it became virtually impossible for the 
Court to find that any such practice existed.35 
In other words, historical practice is relevant only in situations 
where the interpreter has first determined that text is unclear or ambi-
guous.  Or, to put the point another way, Bradley and Morrison fail to 
acknowledge that only an interpreter who believes that text is some-
times unclear or ambiguous will find practice to be a satisfying alter-
native source of constitutional meaning.  Bradley and Morrison assert 
that historical practice and textual ambiguity vary inversely, but this 
analysis misses a vital prior step.  Whether a text is ambiguous is itself 
determined by one’s chosen interpretive method.  Interpreters who are 
strong textualists, structuralists, or originalists will rarely, if ever, rea-
son from historical practice (at least explicitly).  The inverse relation-
ship is certainly accurate as a descriptive or functional matter, but it is 
external to most interpretive systems.  To the extent that an interpreter 
actually believes in a particular mode of interpretation (textualism, cer-
tainly, but also common law constitutionalism, originalism, or welfar-
ism), when she is operating within that system, she will typically not 
engage in a calculus weighing practice and nonpractice evidence.  For 
such interpreters, historical practice is an inferior source of authority.  
The importance of differentiating between the theory and practice of 
historical practice lies in recognizing that although the connection be-
tween practice and nonpractice, or textual, evidence may be described 
in terms of an inverse relationship, few legal interpreters actually view 
the evidence in this way. 
As Bradley and Morrison acknowledge, the difference in approach 
is “methodological.”36  Yet any examination of historical practice must 
reckon with the hierarchy of legal sources in these different methodol-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 32 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
 33 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 11, at 479–80. 
 34 Id. at 431. 
 35 Id. at 480. 
 36 Id. at 431. 
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ogies, and with the fact that the calculus of simply weighing various 
types of constitutional source materials is not available within many 
systems of interpretation.  The choice of methodology is also a choice 
among types of evidence, and the methodological choice typically 
comes first. 
III.  THE “MADISONIAN” MODEL 
Acquiescence is a key indicium of historical practice in Bradley and 
Morrison’s account.  They argue that acquiescence continues to serve 
as a crucial touchstone for arguments based on historical practice, even 
though some of the reasons that earlier generations of jurists and scho-
lars might have given for its centrality are no longer as compelling as 
they once were.  Moreover, Bradley and Morrison argue, acquiescence 
operates differently for the legislative and executive branches, leading 
them to conclude that the standard for finding acquiescence on the 
part of Congress should be higher than that for executive branch  
acquiescence. 
Bradley and Morrison criticize previous invocations of historical 
practice for relying too heavily on a particular concept of acquiescence 
that they argue assumes a “Madisonian conception of interbranch 
competition” that is at best outmoded and at worst erroneous.37  Ac-
cording to this “Madisonian model,” Congress and the president are 
perpetually on “guard against encroachments” on their respective 
spheres of power.38  Consequently, in considering whether a particular 
policy or action by one of the political branches qualifies as historical 
gloss, a finding that the other branch has acquiesced to the prac- 
tice — and thus consented to the putative encroachment — can be  
dispositive. 
In contrast to this view, Bradley and Morrison argue that acquies-
cence deserves more serious consideration in light of modern political 
science scholarship.  The Madisonian model, they contend, no longer 
accurately represents the interactions between the executive and legis-
lative branches.  The concept of institutional acquiescence is still use-
ful, but it “needs to be tied more closely to the reality of how the polit-
ical branches actually interact.”39  In reality, there is no “consistent, 
robust, interbranch rivalry of the sort envisioned in The Federalist No. 
51.”40  Particularly with respect to Congress, they argue, the Madiso-
nian model fails because it does not grasp that members of Congress 
are not only unable to protect the interests of the legislative branch but 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 37 Id. at 414. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id.  
 40 Id. at 446. 
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are not motivated to do so.41  Moreover, acquiescence operates diffe-
rently for each of the political branches.  The President can act unila-
terally; Congress cannot.  The executive branch comprises many advi-
sors on constitutional questions, such as the Office of Legal Counsel; 
Congress lacks such concentrated internal counsel.  Congressional si-
lence is notoriously difficult to interpret: is it acquiescence, the result 
of blockage, or just a sign of inattention?  In short, for Bradley and 
Morrison, the Madisonian model applies more accurately to the Presi-
dent than to Congress, which makes historical-practice analysis diffi-
cult, insofar as it requires inquiry into congressional acquiescence. 
But what is at stake for Bradley and Morrison in this critique of 
the Madisonian model?  They are careful to point out that they “take 
no position on whether The Federalist No. 51 accurately or fully re-
flected Madison’s thoughts” on the separation of powers.42  Moreover, 
a key element of their argument is that historical-practice analysis is 
feasible and useful even in a post-Madisonian world.  They argue that 
acquiescence is a useful marker of practice, as long as it is assessed 
carefully and with sensitivity to the specific dynamics of each 
branch.43  Yet the Madisonian model haunts Bradley and Morrison’s 
account.  Much of their argument presumes an adversarial relationship 
between the political branches and largely overlooks the role of judi-
ciary.  Their Article for the most part treats the judiciary, especially the 
Supreme Court, as an arbiter of separation of powers disputes rather 
than as an active branch of the federal government.  But, as the ex-
amples of judicial review and the political question doctrine demon-
strate, the Court’s decisions on issues of justiciability are assertions of 
ultimate interpretive authority, however deferential and self-restraining 
their immediate impact.44  Just as legislative and executive practice 
generate a historical gloss, so too does judicial practice, insofar as the 
federal courts might also have a known practice of deferring (indeed, 
acquiescing) to one or the other of the political branches.  A complete 
account of historical gloss, and certainly any account of its normative 
desirability, must address the question of courts as gloss producers. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 41 Id. at 441. 
 42 Id. at 439 n.112. 
 43 One question raised by the suggestion that acquiescence might be a sign of a permissible 
“interbranch bargain,” id. at 457, is whether one branch may constitutionally consent to a change 
in its powers.  In the related realm of interstate compacts, the Court has repeatedly held that a 
state may not consent to an infringement on its sovereignty and has made explicit the analogy 
between federalism and separation of powers concerns.  See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 182 (1992) (“The constitutional authority of Congress cannot be expanded by the ‘con-
sent’ of the governmental unit whose domain is thereby narrowed, whether that unit is the Ex-
ecutive Branch or the States.”). 
 44 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 11, at 428–30 (citing judicial review and the political 
question doctrine as “areas where the judiciary’s proper role is seen as particularly limited,” id. at 
429). 
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Moreover, if the Madisonian model as presented here has become 
as much of a cartoonish stereotype as Bradley and Morrison (rightly) 
suggest, it is not clear why their account must devote so much atten-
tion to undermining that model.  In The Federalist No. 51, the actual 
James Madison — writing as Publius — was not focused on giving the 
legislative branch tools to protect itself.  The text of The Federalist No. 
51 demonstrates not the highly schematized machinery of the Madiso-
nian model, but a more pragmatic, and realistic, attempt to connect 
selfish individual motives with the jealousy of the branches.45  Indeed, 
as The Federalist No. 48 demonstrates, given the history of parliamen-
tary overreaching in seventeenth-century England, Madison and his 
contemporaries were more concerned about the potential for legisla-
tures to assume all the powers of government, including what we 
would now term the legislative and executive powers.46 
Bradley and Morrison correctly note that the Madisonian model 
entails several problems.  Indeed, implicit in Bradley and Morrison’s 
critique of Madisonian scholars is the point that to blame Madison for 
not creating a system in which members of Congress systematically 
check executive aggrandizement is willfully anachronistic.47  Such a 
critique faults James Madison for his ostensible failure to have antic-
ipated the insights of late-twentieth- and early-twenty-first-century po-
litical science.  Furthermore, in the 1830s, as he witnessed a series of 
conflicts between President Andrew Jackson and Congress, the elderly 
Madison demonstrated himself to be fully aware of the unmodelable, 
uncontrollable realities of executive-legislative interactions, as well as 
the shifting meanings of “practice.”48   
But what is left after the rejection of the Madisonian model?  The 
richness of Madisonian — as opposed to “Madisonian” — theory pro-
vides a potential source for a more nuanced separation of powers 
theory.  But Bradley and Morrison fail to propose an alternative theory 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 45 See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 347 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra, at 332 (emphasizing that the three branches must 
“be so far connected and blended, as to give to each a constitutional controul over the others,” or 
else “the degree of separation [required] . . . can never in practice, be duly maintained”); see also 
LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY 224 (1995). 
 46 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 45, at 333 (pointing to the legis-
lature’s habit of “extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous 
vortex”); see also BANNING, supra note 45, at 134 (noting Madison and Jefferson’s experience 
with the “overbearing power” of state legislatures during the Revolutionary period). 
 47 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 11, at 446–47. 
 48 See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Martin Van Buren (July 5, 1830), reprinted in 9 
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 376, 376 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910); Letter from James 
Madison to Martin Van Buren (June 3, 1830), reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra, at 375, 375–76 (explaining to Secretary of State Van Buren that President Jack-
son’s veto of the Maysville Road bill had misinterpreted Madison’s famed 1817 veto of the “Bo-
nus Bill,” a controversial federal public-works bill).  
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to replace the Madisonian model as a justification for the use of histor-
ical practice.  Even if they were to give a more precise definition of 
historical practice and acquiescence, absent such a theory, their analy-
sis is incomplete. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Many types of historical practice matter for constitutional law, but 
without an account of which practice and whose practice is most au-
thoritative, appeals to the gloss of history risk becoming hopelessly 
open-ended or distressingly cynical.  Even the most formalist Supreme 
Court decision can become part of the gloss, if we recognize that the 
Justices, like members of Congress and the President, are themselves 
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